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Abstract: In this study, we use patent count data for overall Climate Change Mitigation 
Technologies, and for those related to energy production and distribution to evaluate the 
relationship between the sizable oversupply of European Union emissions Allowances and a policy 
shift marked by the transition from Phase I to Phase II under the European Union Emission 
Trading System, on the one hand, and on “green” patenting, on the other. According to our results, 
the expected negative impact of this oversupply on technological change seems to be confirmed. 
Thus, stakeholders take the actual supply of certificates into account when determining their 
innovative activity. In the same vein, they do so with respect to policy changes related to greater 
stringency, which generated a sizeable increase in patenting activity when controlling for other 
economic factors. Our results suggest that a critical evaluation of emission caps and allowances 
distribution must be undertaken.  
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Policy Stringency under the European Union Emission Trading System and its Impact 
on Technological Change in the Energy Sector 
 
1.  Introduction 
Technological change aimed at mitigating the impact of economic activity on climate change is a 
powerful tool for moving towards a low-carbon economy. To strike out on this path, various 
policies have been adopted worldwide. One of these is the European Union Emission Trading 
System (EU ETS) which, as a market-based regulation, established the first and largest market for 
greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions allowing installations in the system to cut their emissions in a 
flexible and cost-efficient way. However, external shocks and a lack of stringency have led to the 
creation of a sizeable oversupply of allowances in the market, potentially hampering the effect of 
the policy on low-carbon technological change (Sandbag 2013).  
Against this backdrop, the first goal of our study is to determine empirically whether this 
oversupply of allowances in the market has a negative effect on the outcome of the creative process 
in countries covered by the policy. Secondly, we examine how policy changes introducing greater 
stringency affect innovative behavior1. To this end, we use a count data model to estimate the 
impact of certificate oversupply on climate change mitigation technologies (CCMTs) in the energy 
sector. We focus on this sector because it is the most productive in terms of CCMT patenting, and 
we provide information on the selection of this patent variable in Table A-1 (and include details 
explaining the Y02 class). Furthermore, because a policy shift occurred in 2008, we use a binary 
variable (described in section IV) to evaluate the impact of this shift, which is arguably an additional 
effect to that of increased stringency, for the period 2008-2012. 
With this study we seek to contribute to the literature by analyzing how innovation 
responds, on the one hand, to lax policies and, on the other, to more stringent guidelines. We take 
                                                          
1 Performance evaluations of public policies previously implemented can help improve and modify existing 





the specific case of the EU ETS and measure stringency in terms of the number of excess permits 
in the market. We expect a less stringent EU ETS to result in a large oversupply of permits, whereas 
measures that increase the stringency of the trading system are expected to reduce this oversupply. 
As stated above, we focus our attention on technologies that seek to reduce the GHG emissions 
related to energy generation, transmission and distribution. To the best of our knowledge, this is 
the first multivariate empirical analysis to fully consider the first two phases of this policy (2005-
2007 and 2008-2012). As such, this study specifically fills the gap in the literature examining the 
EU ETS and more broadly the gap in the literature concerned with any cap-and-trade regulation. 
Finally, we hope to broaden understanding of the way in which policy failures influence innovative 
behavior in the framework of such policies.   
We organize the rest of the study as follows. First, we provide a brief outline of the EU 
ETS and its different phases and we review the literature. In section 3, we describe the structure of 
the data and the variables used in the empirical exercise. Next, we present the methodology and 
the regression outcomes, the implications of which are then discussed in relation to the research 
questions posed. Finally, we draw our main conclusions and highlight policy measures that might 
put the EU ETS on the right track.     
2. Description & Aims of the Policy 
In 2005 the EU ETS came into operation. The trading system can be considered the European 
Commission’s (EC) main policy for reaching its ambitious GHG reduction targets under the 2030 
framework for climate and energy policies. To date, the 28 EU Member States, as well as three 
additional member states of the European Economic Area (EEA: Iceland, Liechtenstein, and 
Norway) have joined the system, making it the world’s largest carbon market. The main principle 
of the EU ETS can be summed up quite simply as “cap and trade”. The first step in the system – 
“cap” – sees the EC set an EU-wide ceiling for GHG emissions under the policy, which is gradually 
reduced every monitoring period. The GHG ceiling is fixed in such a way that the EC issues so-





to emit one ton of CO2, or an equivalent amount of GHG with respect to its climate impact, as 
listed in Annex II of the EC Directive 2003/87/EC (European Commission 2013).  
Hence, to reduce the EU ETS cap the EC cuts the overall number of EUAs in the market. 
Firms subject to this policy must cover their emissions by allowances; otherwise, they face heavy 
fines for every ton of CO2 emission not covered. The second step – “trade”, on the other hand, 
permits firms in the case of a shortage of allowances to purchase additional EUAs in a common 
market and, so, avoid penalization for non-compliance.2 The principle underpinning the EU ETS 
is market-based regulation that aims to leave the means of compliance in the hands of the firms.  
Currently, 11,500 installations are subject to the policy (Schmalensee and Stavins, 2017), 
accounting for around 45% of total GHG emissions in the participating countries. The policy only 
covers heavy-emitting sectors;3 this includes many manufacturing industries4 and the power 
generation sector. The latter is responsible for the lion’s share of GHG emissions, accounting for 
29% of total GHG emission from the EU 27 (European Environmental Agency, 2014).  
The EU ETS has been implemented in three phases, each marked by fundamental changes 
in policy design. The first phase (2005-07) can be considered a trial phase adhering to a “learning 
by doing” credo. Given that prior to 2005 no reliable emission data for the sectors in the new 
system were available, the main task was to build an EU-wide data base for GHG emissions for 
the participating members. Precisely due to this lack of emission data, the first phase was marked 
by a certificate oversupply that led to EUAs being priced at zero from mid-2006 on.5 The default 
distribution method for the EUAs was that of free allocation in accordance with the national 
allocation plans. With the second phase (2008-12), the EC sought to improve the EU ETS by 
                                                          
2 Furthermore, EU ETS companies can cover some of their emissions using international offsets (“Kyoto-
offsets” – KO), stemming from Clean Development Mechanism or Joint Implementation projects. 
3 From 2012 on, aviation has also been covered by the EU ETS, so that all the participating countries’ flights 
(within, outgoing, and incoming) are subject to the policy.  
4 Manufacturing sectors covered by the EU ETS are oil refineries, steel works and producers of iron, 
aluminum, metals, cements, lime, glass, ceramics, pulps, cardboards, acids, and bulk organic chemicals. 






cutting total allowances by around 6.5% compared to the 2005 level. To counter further price 
corrosion, the EUAs from the first phase were not bankable into the second period, while several 
participants started to auction off some of their allowances as opposed to just giving them away. 
These actions served to strengthen the policy in its aim to cut further GHG emissions.  
However, the start of the second trading period coincided with the onset of the global 
economic crisis (2008/09) which had a marked impact on production levels and, hence, on GHG 
emissions in the participating countries. For this motive, installations in the system reduced their 
emissions by a sizeable volume because of the economic recession, rather than their abatement 
efforts (Bel and Joseph 2015). This in turn led to a build-up of a considerable oversupply of 
allowances in the market, a problem that was exacerbated by the fact that during this second trading 
phase firms could cover part of their emissions by Kyoto-offsets (KOs).6 Overall, the stringency 
of the policy was greatly compromised.7  
The EU ETS is currently in its third phase (2013-2020). A major change with respect to the 
earlier phases is the introduction of a cap that is reduced each year by 1.74% in an attempt at 
reaching the emission abatement target of 21% of the 2005 level by 2020. Likewise, the default 
method for allocating allowances has gradually shifted from a free-of-charge distribution to that of 
auctioning. The EC has also implemented the “back-loading” of additional allowances, thus 
postponing the auctioning of 900 million EUAs until 2019-2020. This resulted in a reduction of 




                                                          
6 See, for instance, Gronwald and Hintermann (2016); Hintermann, Peterson and Rickels (2016, p. 118).   
7 Given that the main principle underpinning the EU ETS is that of ‘cap and trade’ and the capping is 
achieved through the allocation of emission allowances, the overall number of allowances on the market 
determines the degree of stringency of the policy. Brunel and Levinson (2016) review various methods for 
measuring stringency measures, and Sauter (2014) analyzes methods for measuring environmental policy 
stringency. More specifically, Koźluk (2014) discusses environmental policy instruments as a measure of 





3. Induced technological change and the EU ETS 
The main drivers of emission abatement under the EU ETS were, and continue to be, fuel 
switching and the impact of the global recession that hit the EU in 2008/09. Fuel switching has 
proved to be a valid tool for cutting emissions in a cost-efficient manner, especially in the power 
generation sector (Delarue et al. 2008). But, as Calel & Dechezleprêtre (2016) point out, fuel 
switching alone cannot provide sufficient emission abatement to meet the ambitious EU target of 
an 80-95% reduction in 1990 GHG emission levels by 2050. For this reason, the EC emphasizes 
“the Emissions Trading System is the principal driver of the deployment of new technology, by 
putting a price on carbon emissions, and so stimulating the development of technologies which 
avoid them” (European Commission, 2015). The idea underpinning this statement is the 
hypothesis known as “induced innovation”, which was first proposed by Hicks (1930) and later 
reformulated in terms of environmental regulation by Porter (1991) and Porter & van der Linde 
(1995), where it is known as the Porter hypothesis (PH). One version of this hypothesis states that 
well-designed environmental policies can foster “green” innovations.8  
3.1 Market-based regulations and its innovation impact 
Many papers since then have sought to validate, both empirically and theoretically, whether 
environmental regulation de facto spurs environmental innovation.9 Few, however, focused on 
market-based regulations such as the EU ETS. Popp (2003) analyzed the innovation impact of a 
market-based regulation compared to that of a command-and-control regime. Contrary to 
theoretical predictions, the overall number of innovations as measured by patent counts did not 
rise after the introduction of the 1990 Clean Air Act (CAA) in the USA. On the other hand, he 
                                                          
8 This is typically referred to as the “weak” version of the PH. The remaining versions identified by Jaffe & 
Palmer (1997) are the “narrow” and the “strong” version of the PH. 
9As our paper uses an empirical approach and focuses on the EU ETS, a market-based regulation, only 
papers analyzing such policies empirically are presented here. A more detailed overview of current literature 
in the field, however, can be found in Ambec et al. (2013). In addition, it is worth noting recent interesting 
developments in the study of factors that trigger innovation in the energy sector, which report a significant 
positive effect of path dependency, particularly for renewable energy technologies (see Rexhäuser and 





found that the direction of technological change was altered by the policy. Although the overall 
number of patents decreased during the observation period, the quality of patents with respect to 
environmental-friendliness increased. Accordingly, the shift to a market-based regulation spurred 
“green” innovation. 
A second paper that analyzes if “induced innovation” takes place under environmental 
regulation is Lanoie et al. (2011). Using data from a survey conducted in seven OECD countries, 
the authors empirically tested different versions of the PH, and found strong evidence supporting 
the “weak” version. This finding is consistent with the fact that environmental policies alter the 
costs of pollution, by making them part of the production chain. Interestingly, Lanoie et al. (2011) 
also found some support for the “narrow” version of the PH, meaning that more flexible/market-
based regulations can potentially outperform inflexible, classical command-and-control policy 
regimes.  
Johnstone et al. (2010) provide additional evidence that environmental policies spur 
innovation. Using patent counts for renewable energy sources in 25 countries for the period 1978-
2003, the authors demonstrated that different environmental policy regimes result in innovations 
being made in different directions. For example, market-based regulations promote technological 
innovations for renewable energy sources that are in competition with fossil fuels and which are 
less costly to develop (e.g., wind power as opposed to solar power). As this brief review of the 
current literature examining the link between market-based environmental regulations and 
“induced innovation” shows, innovation does occur under such policy regimes and, hence, they 
constitute valid tools for putting an economy on a less-polluting technological pathway.  
3.2 The EU ETS and its impact on innovation 
In the case of the impact of the EU ETS, the results are far from clear, however. Although various 





results remain inconclusive. Anderson et al. (2011), for instance, report a moderate stimulating 
effect of the policy on technological change. Following a survey conducted among EU ETS firms 
in Ireland, the authors conclude that nearly half the companies were engaged in the acquisition of 
new machinery and equipment and two thirds had performed process or behavioral changes. 
Likewise, Fontini and Pavan (2014) find a positive link. In an analysis of the Italian pulp and paper 
industry, they show a positive relation between the initiation of the second trading period and 
technological change in the sector. However, the reduction in emissions detected during the study 
period was due mainly to an overall reduction in output and not to technological change, and so 
they conclude that the ETS has had only a limited, albeit positive, impact on low-carbon 
technological change.  
Similar impacts of the EU ETS were reported by Rogge and Hoffmann (2010) in an interview-
based study of the German electricity sector.10 The policy was seen to have had an impact on R&D 
for carbon capture technologies, especially on large-scale, coal-based power generation; however, 
the authors claim that the impact was limited by the free allocation of EUAs in the market. Further 
evidence of the positive impact on innovation can be found in Petsonk and Cozijnsen (2007) and 
Martin et al. (2011), the second of these studies suggesting that the amount of freely allocated 
allowances hampers innovation incentives under the policy regime.    
In contrast, a large number of studies attest to the fact the system has no or little influence 
on firms’ innovative behavior. For example, Borghesi et al. (2012) show that the EU ETS has 
resulted in few environmental innovations among Italian manufacturing firms and attribute this to 
the lack of policy stability. Aghion et al. (2009) share this opinion, arguing that in a cap-and-trade 
system a sufficiently high carbon price is needed to induce technological change and policy stability 
                                                          
10 Similar studies by Hoffmann (2007) and Rogge et al. (2011) come to similar conclusions but are more 





is essential. However, they show that neither factor was observed during the first few years of the 
policy, thus hampering the development of “green” innovations.    
One of the most ambitious studies, in terms of the number of firms in the system to be 
examined, is Calel and Dechezleprêtre (2016). To verify the true impact of the EU ETS on 
patenting behavior, firms in the system were matched with other firms of similar characteristics 
and a difference-in-difference estimation was performed. This showed that the EU ETS was 
responsible for just a 2% increase in low-carbon patenting and that the impact of the policy on 
“green” technological change has been limited to date. 
Likewise, Martin et al. (2012) performed an evidence review of existing literature examining 
various features of the EU ETS, including emission abatement, economic performance and also 
innovation. In the case of the latter, the study could find no strong evidence that the EU ETS is 
driving technological change for directly regulated firms.  
In the following sections, we conduct our empirical exercise, which allows us to make 
several contributions to the literature. First, we show how stringency under EU ETS, expressed in 
terms of oversupply, on the one hand, and policy regime changes, on the other, affects innovative 
behavior in those countries subject to the EU ETS. We are thus able to give an initial percentage 
estimate of these two effects under the EU ETS. Second, we separate the impact of oversupply 
and policy changes with respect to overall CCMTs and technologies for the reduction of GHG 
related to energy generation, transmission and distribution. Finally, we should stress that, while the 
papers listed above only cover the first phase of the EU ETS, our study deals with the second 
phase as well. 
 
4. Data Sources and Variables 
In order to account properly for the cross-national character of the EU ETS, we constructed a 
longitudinal data set covering the 27 states of the EU plus the EFTA-state Norway between 2005 





because in 2004, 10 states accessed the EU (followed by a further two in 2007). Data prior to 
accession lack the necessary homogeneity and completeness that our analysis demands. We choose 
2012 as the final year for our study because the second EU-ETS phase terminated that year. As 
such, we can evaluate two complete phases.  
Our final data sample comprises 217 observations.11 Data for this study have been taken 
from Eurostat, with the exception of the variables related to the EU ETS (i.e. allocated allowances 
and verified emissions), which were provided by the Community Independent Transaction Log 
(CITL).  
 
4.1 The dependent variables: Patent Counts for CCMT 
To measure the innovative activity of countries covered by the policy, we use patent counts of 
CCMTs as a proxy, in line with earlier studies, e.g. Calel and Dechezleprêtre (2016). The advantages 
and disadvantages of using patents as an output measure of the creative process have been widely 
discussed. The typical drawback of patent data is that they only capture part of the outcome of 
innovative activities, since not all technological improvements are patented, voluntarily or 
otherwise, while innovations might also be of an organizational nature [Popp (2003, pp. 658-659); 
Mazzanti and Zoboli (2006, p. 27, table 2.a)]. However, other authors, including Griliches (1990) 
and Wagner & Wakeman (2016), have endorsed the use of patent count data. Therefore, while we 
acknowledge that patent counts are subject to certain limitations when used to account for 
technological change, such data are a useful and frequently used measure for the innovative activity 
of firms, sectors, and countries.  
The patent counts used in this study were created originally by the EPO and subsequently 
aggregated to the country-level by Eurostat. Every newly filed patent at the EPO is classified 
according to the Cooperative Patent Classification (CPC), recently enriched by the introduction of 
                                                          
11 Bulgaria and Romania joined the EU and, thus, the EU ETS, in 2007, so data for these two countries are 





the new patent class, Y02, for patents providing CCMTs (see information in Table A-1). Here, we 
focus specifically on subclass Y02E, which includes technologies for the reduction of GHG 
emission, related to energy generation, transmission or distribution.12 We also use patents from 
class Y02, to conduct a robustness check for our results. 
An initial inspection of data for the Y02 patents shows several peculiarities. The most 
striking is the heterogeneity in the number of patent counts per country. In our sample, twelve 
countries13 account for most CCMT patent applications at the EPO and together account for over 
60% of overall patent applications. Additionally, we identify a strong outlier – Germany (as noted 
by Dechezleprêtre et al., 2011), which accounts for more than three times the mean number of 
applications than the country ranked second, France (Figure 1 shows the distribution of patents by 
country, for class Y02, and subclasses Y20E and Y20C). We specifically discuss and consider this 
when modeling the relationship between innovative behavior and the oversupply of certificates. 
(Insert figure 1 here 
Figure 1: Patent Counts per Country) 
 
4.2 The explanatory variables 
Table 1 provides a detailed overview of the variables used, including their descriptive statistics, 
units of measurement and labels. 
(Insert table 1 around here) 
Explanatory variables must fulfill different tasks in regression equations. In our case, we 
identify the following groups of explanatory variables to address different features of the number 
of patent applications per country. As we are interested in measuring the impact of the policy on 
                                                          
12 Even though Y02C class technologies find appliance in the energy sector, they may also be employed in 
other sectors, but a clear distinction is not given. We include the Y02C class in Figure 1. 
13 Austria, Belgium, Germany, Denmark, Spain, Finland, France, United Kingdom, Italy, the Netherlands, 





patent counts, our “core” variables are the oversupply of allowances and the binary variable 
controlling for policy changes between the two trading phases.  
Because we are interested in the role of EUA oversupply and major policy changes on 
patenting behavior, we examine these variables first. In this study, the stock of oversupply is 
defined as the annual accumulated number of excess EUAs allocated to each member state in the 
market, i.e.,  the difference between the total number of allowances allocated in the market and 
total emissions in each respective year accumulated over the period. In addition, and to ensure 
policy features, such as the cancelation of allowances from the first phase, are correctly taken into 
account in the second phase, the stock of oversupply is calculated separately for the two trading 
phases. We opted for this calculation as firms access not only their own oversupply but also that 
of the market as whole, since a common market place exists. It quickly becomes apparent that 
during the period most countries operating under the EU ETS were able to build up a sizable 
oversupply.14  
Furthermore, and in order to specify correctly the impact of policy stringency on patenting 
behavior and so as not to mistakenly attribute the effects of other influences to these variables, we 
use a broad set of controls. We use lagged business enterprise and government R&D spending,15 
measured as percentage of Gross Domestic Product (GDP), and the number of workers with 
tertiary education, given that these variables have been shown to be highly influential in 
determining innovation output (Griliches 1984).  
                                                          
14 Full data on oversupply by countries is provided in EU Emissions Trading System (ETS) data viewer 
(European Environment Agency) https://www.eea.europa.eu/data-and-maps/dashboards/emissions-
trading-viewer-1  (‘allowances and emissions’) 
15 We also checked for overall patenting trends in our regressions, using overall patent counts divided by 
the population of a country for a given year. However, this trend variable is highly correlated with business 
enterprise R&D and, hence, caused severe multicollinearity problems in our regressions. When introduced 
separately, the variable presented high statistical significance and the expected positive impact on CCMTs. 
However, we opted to use business enterprise R&D expenditure because of its well-known impact on 
patenting activity and also because the use of either of the two variables did not modify the outcomes of 





We introduce an additional set of covariates to capture the economic performance of 
countries during the period of observation and respective industry size. We use these variables 
because it is has been shown that large industrial economies tend to have the most burdensome 
environmental problems and policies (Meyer, 1992, p.35). Therefore, a relation between economic 
performance and CCMTs, as a means for reducing compliance costs, may exist. These variables 
are industry indicators for the three main sectors – Mining and Quarrying (NACE B), 
Manufacturing (NACE C), and Energy (NACE D) – covered by the policy and annual GDP 
growth rates. All variables measuring a country’s and a sector’s economic performance are lagged 
one year, because it seems reasonable to think that last year’s economic outcomes influence this 
year’s patent rates, given the time it takes for an innovation to become eligible for patenting.16 As 
shown earlier, energy related patents make up the clear majority of CCMT patents. In line with 
Edenhofer et al. (2012), and to incorporate this circumstance, we introduce the share of energy 
from renewable sources into the equations, as this is an obvious indication of “green” technological 
change.17  
The two trading phases are characterized by major policy changes (see section 2 above; Bel 
and Joseph, 2015). For instance, “penalties for violations increased from €40 per ton of CO2 in the 
first phase to €100 in the second phase (…). The system’s cap was tightened for Phase II (2008-
12)” (Schmalensee and Stavins, 2017, p. 581). A regression equation analyzing these policy shifts 
needs to take these circumstances into consideration. For this reason, we created a dummy variable 
equal to 1 for years belonging to the second trading period and equal to zero for the years belonging 
to the first period. This allows us to identify whether patenting behavior changed during the shift 
from phase one to two. Considering that the second trading phase tightened emission caps and 
                                                          
16 Recall we do not use a lagged form for employment in the tertiary sector, as we believe the character of 
this variable does not make it necessary. 
17 We tried – alternatively – the share of renewable installed capacity, and obtained the same results from 





reduced the share of certificates allocated free of charge, this policy shift is equivalent to an increase 
in policy stringency and should have a positive effect on patenting behavior.  
 
5.  Methodology  
To measure empirically the impact of the excess supply of EUAs, the following reduced form 
equations are estimated, using a count data approach: 
𝑃𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐿. 𝑒𝑢𝑎𝑜𝑣𝑠𝑡−1 + 𝛽2𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦_𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑖 ,𝑡 +  𝛽3𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑖,𝑡 +
𝛽4𝐿. 𝐵𝐸𝑅𝐷𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽5𝐿. 𝐺𝑂𝑅𝐷𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽6𝐿. 𝑛𝑎𝑐𝑒𝑏𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽7𝐿. 𝑛𝑎𝑐𝑒𝑐𝑖,𝑡−1 +
𝛽8𝐿. 𝑛𝑎𝑐𝑒𝑑𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽9𝐿. 𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑖,𝑡−1
+ 𝛽10𝐿. 𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑤𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝜇𝑖,𝑡 +
𝜀𝑖,𝑡                                                         (1)                                        
where the dependent variable Patents is a count of Y02E patent applications registered at the EPO 
(note, Patents serves as a placeholder for the Y02 class in the robustness check). The core variables 
in our estimations are lagged eua_ovs, which represents the annual accumulated oversupply of 
EUAs, and the dummy_ets, which reflects policy changes during the transition from Phase I to 
Phase II (with values zero for years in the first trading period, and 1 in the second period). The 
other variables (as defined in the previous section) are the following:18 empl is the number of 
workers in the tertiary sector; L.BERD and L.GORD are the lagged R&D expenditures. L.nace_b, 
-_c, and –_d are lagged economic industry indices for the main sectors covered by EU ETS. 
L.GDP_growth is the lagged percentage change in GDP. renew represents the lagged share of 
renewable energies in the gross final energy consumption. μi,t is the between-entity error and εi,t is 
the within-entity error term of the random effect specification. Subscripts i and t define the cross-
section and the time dimension of our data.      
                                                          
18 We have chosen a one-year time lag following Pakes and Griliches (1984). These authors compute a mean 
lag of 1.6 years as their mean R&D project gestation lag. We believe that given that more than three decades 
have passed since Pakes and Griliches (1984), it is sensible to assume that technological development will 





We use negative binomial random effects estimates,19 whereby the mean equals μ, and the 
variance can increase by parameter α > 0, allowing for unobserved heterogeneity across the sample. 
Hence, the first two moments of the negative binomial distribution are given by:  
𝐸[𝑦|𝜇, 𝛼] = 𝜇 
𝑉[𝑦|𝜇, 𝛼] = 𝜇(1 + 𝛼𝜇) 
Recall that the variance now exceeds the mean, thereby addressing the problem of over-
dispersion of the data and allowing unobserved heterogeneity to alter the mean-variance 
relationship. Moreover, we use random effects due to short panel properties and the corresponding 
incidental parameter problem (Cameron & Trivedi 2013, Hilbe 2011, Greene 2007).20 Furthermore, 
we use the exposure variable GDPvol,, measured in this study as GDP in volumes, to account for 
country size differences. To obtain robust standard errors for our coefficient estimates 
bootstrapping with 1000 replications is used. A more detailed discussion regarding the robustness 
of our estimates and resulting bias can be found in the appendix along with bias-corrected 
confidence intervals (Table A4 and A5). We use maximum likelihood as our estimation method.  
 
6. Estimation Results 
In line with the methodology outlined above, we performed the estimations for the Y02E subclass 
(Table 2). The overall model fit, given by the 𝜒2 statistic of the Wald test, rejects the H0 of joint 
statistical insignificance. We use a likelihood-ratio test to check if the panel structure is justified or 
whether a pooled estimator with constant over-dispersion should be used. We reject the H0 of 
constant over-dispersion; hence, the panel structure chosen for our model is valid. Additionally, 
                                                          
19 We do not use a Poisson regression because it is too restrictive in the case of our data (Hausman et al. 
1984; Cameron and Trivedi 2005; Johnstone et al. 2010). See Figure A1 in the appendix.   
20 As Dhaene and Jochmans (2015: 992) explain, fixed-effect approaches typically are faced with the problem 
that maximum-likelihood estimates are not consistent when the number of units increases but the number 
of observations per unit is fixed. They also stress that the incidental-parameter problem is most severe in 





we performed a multicollinearity test. This shows that all variance inflation factors are well below 
five, suggesting that there are no problems of multicollinearity in our regressions (Table A2). The 
overall sample included 217 observations; however, due to the use of lagged variables the sample 
size was reduced by 28 observations in the regressions.  
(Insert table 2 around here) 
  
6.1 EUA oversupply and policy changes    
The main purpose of the empirical exercise is to verify if the impact of the certificate oversupply 
is robust even when applying a broad set of controls and if policy changes related to higher 
stringency affect YE02 patenting. If we inspect the estimates corresponding to oversupply (eua_ovs), 
this would appear to be the case. The outcomes show high significance levels (at the 1% level). The 
sign associated with every equation is, as expected, negative, indicating that an increase in market 
oversupply reduces the overall number of “green” patents. Following the same intuition, the 
dummy variable indicating the shift between the two trading phases, in common with the 
oversupply variable, shows a high statistical significance at the 1% level, but it presents a positive 
impact on CCMT patents. This implies that the shift from phase I to phase II can be considered 
as having been a positive stimulus towards more environment-friendly technological change, as the 
second phase increased the stringency of the EU ETS. These are the overt conclusions to be drawn 
from the statistical analysis; however, the implications of these results are complex.  
Our results show that “green” technology change is closely related to the EU ETS, when 
technology change is measured in terms of patent applications registered at the EPO. Yet, the 
current situation of the EU ETS, characterized by an excess supply of allowances, cannot be 
considered conducive to technology change; a lax EU ETS does not increase innovation as much 
as a stringent EU ETS. This means that the oversupply of allowances in the market causes the 
policy to lose much of its potential for fostering the technological change needed to achieve the 





changes expressed using the dummy variable, since higher stringency leads to more “green” 
patenting activity and, finally, to an increase in environment-friendly production. 
 
6.2. Results for control variables 
The variables known to have an impact on innovation are statistically significant in the 
estimations; that is, as expected, they positively influence the patenting of CCMTs. Tertiary 
employment and business enterprise R&D expenditure (L.BERD) have a positive impact on the 
number of patent applications, at the 1% level. However, the same is not true of government R&D 
expenditure – the coefficient for L.GORD being statistically insignificant.  
As for overall economic performance (L.GDP_growth) and sector-specific performance 
(L.nace_b,c,d), our results suggest that patenting in the Y02E category is not affected by the 
expansion of a country’s economy in the previous year. However, if we examine the sector-specific 
economic performance this picture changes. We do not find a statistically significant relationship 
between higher activity levels in the mining and quarrying sector (nace_b) and patent activity, and 
we record only a small negative impact (with weak statistical significance, at the 10% level) for the 
manufacturing sector (nace_c). In contrast, the coefficient measuring the impact of the performance 
of the energy sector shows high statistical significance and a positive relationship with respect to 
“green” patenting activities. The use of the share of energy from renewable sources is statistically 
insignificant, indicating that it does not affect green patenting in our sample. 
  
6.3 Robustness check 
To check the robustness of our results we estimated the same equation but here for all patents in 
the Y02 class. Table 3 presents the results of this estimation. The overall fit and robustness of the 
estimation are the same as those reported for Y20E. This is true of all the coefficients, signs and 
statistical significances of all the explanatory variables, with just one minor exception: the 





insignificant. Thus, we can state that the results of our estimation are robust to the inclusion of all 
other Y02 patent types, besides those of the Y02E subclass.  
(Insert table 3 around here) 
 In Table A3 in the appendix we also show the estimation results for Y02E and Y02 patent 
types using fixed effects, because the Hausman test for random and fixed effects could not be 
estimated properly for all model specifications. The table shows that when using fixed effects the 
results do not vary significantly and the main outcomes related to our key variables remain 
unchanged. We conducted an additional robustness test by replacing the binary variable with time 
effects. The two columns furthest to the right in Table A3 display the results from these 
estimations. The coefficient signs are the same and the significance differs only slightly. 
Interestingly, we find strong positive effects in the first two years of the second phase (2009 and 
2010), but that the positive effect erodes thereafter. 
 
6.4 Quantification of impact of oversupply and the policy shift 
In this subsection, we quantify the impacts obtained in the estimations above. Figure 2 
shows the impact of different degrees of oversupply, and the shift from Phase I to Phase II, on the 
Y02E subclass, so as to shed more light on the effects of the EU ETS. As such, we are able to 
predict the average number of CCMTs under the different scenarios of overall oversupply21 in the 
market and between the two trading phases, by employing our estimation results in Table 2. All the 
other covariates in our regressions are allowed to vary, as they do in our sample (Stata Corp LP, 
2013). First, it is apparent that there is a clear negative relationship between oversupply and the 
associated number of patent applications; and, second, that the predicted number of patent 
applications varies considerably between the two phases as expressed by the upward shifts in the 
respective curves (red vs. blue).22   
                                                          
21 We decided to use a range from -1000 MgT to 7000 MgT, since these two values mark the extreme values 
of accumulated oversupply in our data sample.  
22 Recall that we constructed Figure 2 by including situations in which the oversupply of permits in the 





(Insert around here 
Figure 2: Estimated Number of Y02E patents for given levels of certificate oversupply and Phase I & II) 
In addition to the graphical representation of the effects of oversupply and the transition 
from Phase I to II, Table 4 presents numerical examples of these effects. As can be seen, the shift 
between trading phases is associated with an increase of around 35% in the case of the Y02E 
category (we also include the corresponding calculation for Y02, as this is obtained directly from 
the results in Table 3), when evaluated as the mean of the accumulated oversupply. Similarly, we 
are also interested in determining the number of patent applications we can expect if the oversupply 
were to be reduced. By way of example, we calculated the expected increase in patent applications 
in both the Y02E subclass and the Y02 class in the case of a reduction in oversupply from its mean 
to a balanced oversupply, that is, an oversupply that equals zero. For this numerical example, the 
resulting increases for both patent categories and phases are around 9%, which highlights the 
strong negative impact of oversupply on patenting behavior. Recall the fact that the Y02E subclass 
accounts for over 90% of all CCMT patents explains the very small variations between the Y02E 
and Y02 patent types. 
(Insert table 4 around here) 
The situation is exacerbated by other modes of compliance that are available under the 
system, specifically, the Kyoto-offsets. These additional certificates of negligible price undermine 
even further the incentives to innovate by reducing the cost of compliance for market participants.  
Our findings show that the EU ETS, as a market-based regulation, has an impact on the 
countries’ levels of innovative activity (in terms of number of patents for CCMTs); however, so do 
policy failures. The patents in the countries affected by the system are not responding to the policy 
as expected, owing, on the one hand, to the negative impact of EUA oversupply on patent 
applications at the EPO, and, on the other, to policy changes related to greater stringency positively 
                                                          
a permit shortage would not have a linear impact on innovation, but rather it could give rise to a marked 
non-linear response of innovation to climate policy stringency. If this were the case, we can consider the 





affecting “green” patenting. Thus, in line with Porter & van der Linde’s (1995) claim, the stringency 
of the policy plays a vital role in determining whether an environmental policy will spur 
technological change. Here, we can assume that a shortage of EUA allowances in the market might 
serve to encourage innovation (Figure 2).   
   
7. Conclusion 
In this study we evaluate the relationship between the sizable oversupply of EUAs and a policy 
shift marked by the transition from Phase I to Phase II under the EU ETS on technological change, 
on the one hand, and its impact on “green” patenting, on the other. To do so, we use patent count 
data for all CCMTs and CCMTs related to energy generation, transmission and distribution. 
According to our results, the expected negative impact of this oversupply on technological change 
(with respect to the stringent policy) seems to be confirmed. Thus, stakeholders under the EU ETS 
do consider their emissions when determining their innovative activity. In the same vein, they likely 
do so with respect to policy changes implementing greater stringency, as these generated a sizeable 
increase in patenting activity when controlling for other economic factors. However, we also take 
into account policy failures, in this case the oversupply of certificates. The latter is clearly apparent 
in the strong negative impact of the excess supply of EUAs on the number of CCMT patent 
applications (compared, that is, with a stringent policy). Therefore, two contrary but not mutually 
exclusive effects have been identified as operating under the trading system.   
From a policy perspective, we ought to acknowledge that the EU ETS, as lax as it was, may 
well have been the only acceptable option for policy makers at the time the system was designed 
and implemented. As such, oversupply may represent the toll paid to ensure the initial system was 
approved and implemented, on the grounds that it was better than no system at all. Likewise, the 
fact that the EU has attempted to increase its stringency over the years may have been the necessary 
outcome of what might be seen as a system based on trial-and-error. That said, we believe that 





the EC introduced the “back-loading” of new allowances in the third trading period, a rigorous 
cancelling of allowances would help put the policy back on the right track and ensure the rethinking 
of production in a more environment-friendly way. A second approach, and one contemplated by 
the EC, involves the introduction of a market stability reserve. In principle, this reserve should 
guarantee that a certain threshold of excess EUAs (833 million allowances) is not passed. Were it 
to be exceeded, the market stability reserve would deduct the excess amount from future auction 
volumes (European Commission, 2014b). Even though this approach sounds promising, its 
introduction has been postponed until 2021, the start of the fourth trading period.  
In addition, given that the market for EUAs adheres to the fundamentals of supply and 
demand in fixing prices, it is prone to external shocks such as the recent economic crisis that 
seriously hampered the systems credibility as a driver of low-carbon technologies. In order for the 
market to be less vulnerable to shocks, a price floor could be installed guaranteeing a minimum 
price for EUAs and, thus, providing the policy with both greater stringency and stability. Such a 
price floor would have to be sufficiently high to spur innovation, but low enough to avoid a 
crowding-out of production and a loss of competitiveness in the EU. These measures would likely 
be opposed by the industrial sector, but they would put the policy back on track. Furthermore, and 
given the positive impact of the increase in policy stringency represented by the shift from Phase I 
to II, policymakers are urged to revise existing and future emission caps, to firmly place the EU on 
a low-carbon pathway, since this transition in our data sample is related to a marked increase in 
“green” technological change.   
From a scholarly perspective, our results suggest that market-based regulations have an 
impact on innovative behavior at the country level and when they are well designed such regulations 
can spur innovation, as higher stringency seems to influence overall patent counts (as highlighted 
in our data). 
Overall, the results presented in this research are robust to a broad set of controls and show 





behavior in the field of CCMTs. Future research needs to focus on comparing market-based 
regulations, such as the EU ETS, and a suitable counterfactual in order to measure what might 
have occurred if there had not been such an excess of allowances. 
Our study is subject to limitations, among which we should mention the shortcomings 
involved from using quantitative patent data (without considering the adoption of innovations or 
the quality of patents). Moreover, we use country-level data rather than firm-level data. Yet, our 
analysis has allowed us to identify the overall impact of an excess supply of certificates on “green” 
patenting. Future research, however, should seek to use firm-level data. More specifically, the 
matching of single firms by patents and their respective shortage/oversupply of allowances could 
be used to cross-validate our findings. Furthermore, future research would benefit from taking into 
account intercountry emission trading.   
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(Insert Figure A1: Empirical Distribution of Y02 patent counts, Negative Binomial Distribution, 
and Poisson Distribution) 
 
(Insert table A1) 
 
(Insert Table A2) 
 
(Insert Table A3) 
 
(Insert Table A4) 
 
(Insert Table A5) 
 
Notes to Tables A4 and A5: 
Since we are using bootstrapping in order to obtain robust estimates for our standard errors, we 
need to examine more closely the bootstrap results for our two main regressions in Tables 2 and 
3. The main idea underpinning bootstrapping is to estimate the standard error by drawing repeated 
bootstrap samples from the original data by using sampling with replacement and by fitting the 
model repeatedly. In our case, we use 1000 bootstrap replications of our data sample. As the model 
is fitted over and over again, a bias estimate of the observed statistic and the bootstrap estimates 
can be constructed (Stata Corp., 2015) along with bias-corrected confidence intervals (CI). As can 
be seen in Tables A4 and A5, some coefficient estimates of our main equation exhibit a slight bias, 
therefore, we are interested in knowing if these estimates still lie within a CI that takes the bias into 
account. For this reason, the bias-corrected CI intervals along with their estimated bias are 
presented here. As can be seen in Tables A4 and A5, even though bias is present for some estimates, 
all the statistically significant coefficients of our main estimations in Tables 2 and 3 lie well inside 





Table 1: Variable Overview      
Variables Description N mean sd min max 
              
Y02E 
Number of Patent application at the EPO 
for the Y02E category 
217 72.25 161.3 0 1,017 
Y02 
Number of Patent application at the EPO 
for the Y02 category 
217 75.47 167.7 0 1,056 
GDP_growth 
Percentage change of GDP on previous 
year 
217 1.524 4.223 -17.70 11 
Renew 
Share of renewable energy in gross final 
energy consumption 
217 15.11 13.27 0.300 64.80 
nace_b 
Volume index of production for the mining 
and quarrying sector; data adjusted by 
working days 
217 108.3 21.03 61.91 224.8 
nace_c 
Volume index of production for the 
manufacturing sector; data adjusted by 
working days 
217 103.4 10.06 65.54 130.0 
nace_d 
Volume index of production for the energy 
sector; data adjusted by working days 
217 98.91 7.515 75.87 119.1 
BERD 
Business enterprise R&D expenditure as 
percentage of GDP 
217 0.915 0.690 0.0600 2.680 
GORD 
Governmental R&D expenditure as 
percentage of GDP 
217 0.194 0.0887 0.0100 0.410 
GDPvolume 
Gross Domestic Product at current prices, 
million euros 
217 471,488 688,090 5,142 2.758e+06 
eua_ovs 
Yearly accumulated oversupply of EUA in 
the market in Mgt. 
217 2,043 2,356 -1,088 7,023 
Empl 
Total Employees with tertiary education 
(levels 5-8) from age 25-64 in thousands  
217 2,073 2,771 20 10,889 
dummy_ets 
Dummy for the shift from phase one to 
phase two of the EU ETS 
217 0.686 0.465 0 1 
              







Table 2: Estimation Results for the Random Effects Negative Binomial – Y02E 
  RE regression for Y02E 
  (2) 
L.eua_ovs  -4.35e-05*** 
  (1.43e-05) 
1.dummy_ets  0.298*** 
  (0.0579) 
empl  8.44e-05*** 
  (3.28e-05) 
L.BERD  0.919*** 
  (0.179) 
L.GORD  -0.935 
  (0.887) 
L.nace_b  -0.000893 
  (0.00232) 
L.nace_c  -0.00609* 
  (0.00366) 
L.nace_d  0.0157*** 
  (0.00543) 
L.GDP_growth  0.000799 
  (0.0105) 
L.renew  0.00142 
  (0.00658) 
Constant  -11.05*** 
  (1.130) 
   
Observations  189 
Number of Panels  28 
F  132.1 
Panel vs Pooled  260.1 
Log-Likelihood  -588.8 
Bootstrap Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05 
Note: A brief discussion of the use of bootstrap technique along with bias corrected 








Table 3: Estimation Results for the Random Effects Negative Binomial – Y02 
 RE regression for Y02  
 (1)  
L.eua_ovs -4.23e-05***  
 (1.49e-05)  
1.dummy_ets 0.303***  
 (0.0509)  
empl 8.12e-05***  
 (2.74e-05)  
L.BERD 0.897***  
 (0.186)  
L.GORD -0.820  
 (0.882)  
L.nace_b -0.000579  
 (0.00231)  
L.nace_c -0.00588  
 (0.00374)  
L.nace_d 0.0152***  
 (0.00506)  
L.GDP_growth 0.000990  
 (0.0105)  
L.renew 0.00199  
 (0.00627)  
Constant -11.06***  
 (1.230)  
   
Observations 189  
Number of Panels 28  
F 143.7  
Panel vs Pooled 261.2  
Log-Likelihood -594.6  
Bootstrap Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05 
Note: A brief discussion of the use of bootstrap technique along with bias corrected 







Table 4: Estimated Changes in Patent Counts due to Oversupply Reduction and 
Transition from Phase I to II  
     
  
Oversupply Reduction (From Mean Oversupply to Balanced Supply)  
  
 Y02E Patents Y02 Patents 
 
Phase I  Phase II Phase I Phase II 
Mean Oversupply (2000 MgT) 61.23  82.45 62.37 84.44 
      
Balanced Supply ( 0 Mgt) 66.8  90 67.9 91.9 
      
% Change Mean Oversupply to Balanced 
Supply: 
9.1%  9.16% 8.9% 8.8% 
      
 
Transition Phase I to II given the Mean Oversupply 
 
 Phase I  Phase II 
Mean % Change 
Phase I to Phase II 
Y02E Patents 
Mean Oversupply (2000 MgT) 61.23  82.45 34.64% 
Y02 Patents     
Mean Oversupply (2000 MgT) 62.37  84. 44 35.38% 
      















































































Figure 1: Patent Counts per Country








Figure 2: Estimated Number of Y02E patents for given levels of certificate oversupply and Phase 











Table A1: The Y02E patent subclass (CPC classification) 
Patent Class Definition Examples 
Y02 Climate Change Mitigation Technologies 
Subclass Y02E 
Y02E Reduction of GHG emissions related to energy generation, transmission or 
distribution 
Y02E10/00 Energy generation through 
renewable energy sources 
Geothermal Energy / Hydro Energy / 
Energy from Sea / Photovoltaic 
(PV)Energy / Thermal-PV hybrids / Wind 
Energy 
Y02E 20/00 Combustion technologies with 
mitigation potential 
Combined combustion / Technologies for 
a more efficient combustion or heat usage 
Y02E 40/00 Technologies for an efficient 
electrical power generation, 
transmission or distribution 
Flexible AC transmission systems / Active 








Table A2: Multicollinearity  
Variable: VIF 










    







Table A3: Estimation Results for (1) the Fixed Effects Negative Binomial (central model), and (2) with 
inclusion of time effects.  




FE regression Y02E 
with time effects 
FE regression for 
Y02 with time effects 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
L.eua_ovs -5.00e-05*** -4.72e-05*** 0.000418** 0.000444** 
 (1.44e-05) (1.46e-05) (0.000165) (0.000166) 
1.dummy_ets 0.231*** 0.254*** - 
- 
 (0.0662) (0.0718) - 
- 
2007 - - 0.0142 
0.00918 
 - - (0.100) 
(0.0981) 
2008 - - 0.0261 
0.0357 
 - - (0.146) 
(0.142) 
2009 - - 1.229*** 
1.310*** 
 - - (0.352) 
(0.352) 
2010 - - 0.372** 
0.417** 
 - - (0.149) 
(0.157) 
2011 - - -0.192 
-0.184 
 - - (0.271) 
(0.267) 
2012 - - -1.133** 
-1.166** 
 - - (0.559) 
(0.555) 
empl 0.000143 0.000130 0.000159* 
0.000139 
 (0.000148) (0.000170) (9.10e-05) 
(8.79e-05) 
L.BERD 0.458 0.443 0.423 
0.417 
 (0.353) (0.365) (0.278) 
(0.287) 
L.GORD -1.244 -1.049 -0.934 
-0.681 
 (1.890) (1.770) (-1.307) 
(-1.277) 
L.nace_b -0.000981 -0.000855 -5.46e-05 
0.000130 
 (0.00252) (0.00256) (0.00289) 
(0.00236) 
L.nace_c -0.00382 -0.00383 -0.00609 
-0.00638 
 (0.00449) (0.00497) (0.00688) 
(0.00650) 
L.nace_d 0.0148** 0.0143** 0.0119*** 
0.0114*** 
 (0.00595) (0.00606) (0.00315) 
(0.00358) 
L.GDP_growth -0.00519 -0.00415 -0.0136 
-0.0113 
 (0.0103) (0.0108) (0.0118) 
(0.0132) 
L.renew 0.0205 0.0165 0.00977 
0.00362 
 (0.0189) (0.0205) (0.0302) 
(0.0320) 
Constant -10.75*** -10.68*** -10.37*** 
-10.30*** 
 -1.847 -2.152 (0.987) (0.996) 
     
Observations 189 189 189 
1889 
# of country_id 28 28 28 
28 
Log-likelihood -439.3 -444.2 -430.2 
-434.8 
F 110.4 173.2 331.9 
351.5 












Std. Err. Bias Corrected 95% CI 
      
L.eua_ovs -0.0000435 -7.61e-07 0.00001431 -0.0000645 -5.57e-06 
1.dummy_ets 0.29753154 -0.0900356 0.05798752 0.2864695 0.4454681 
empl 0.00008443 -0.0000218 0.00003283 0.000063 0.0001832 
L.BERD 0.91935097 0.0043223 0.17971756 0.5384822 1.237758 
L.GORD -0.93454461 0.8202854 0.8872565 -2.563458 -0.5251221 
L.nace_b -0.00089334 -0.0007591 0.002327 -0.005792 0.0038918 
L.nace_c -0.00609018 -0.0010591 0.00366387 -0.0118202 0.003368 
L.nace_d 0.01567101 0.0005973 0.00543457 0.0029716 0.0249605 
L.GDP_growth 0.00079945 0.0016735 0.01050609 -0.0218497 0.0201261 
L.renew 0.00141611 -0.0033343 0.00658138 -0.0039071 0.034089 

















Bias Corrected 95% CI 
      
L.eua_ovs -0.00004231 1.21e-07 0.00001489 -0.0000651 -1.14e-06 
1.dummy_ets 0.30285061 -0.0872592 0.0509891 0.3011571 0.3669948 
empl 0.00008119 -0.0000187 0.00002739 0.0000554 0.000174 
L.BERD 0.8967919 -0.0029875 0.18639573 0.5580202 1.290858 
L.GORD -0.81988383 0.8897865 0.88158716 -2.364736 -0.4961863 
L.nace_b -0.00057921 -0.0007537 0.00231908 -0.0055886 0.0035368 
L.nace_c -0.00587567 -0.000895 0.00374239 -0.0112374 0.0045524 
L.nace_d 0.01520467 0.0005891 0.0050665 0.0042161 0.0243689 
L.GDP_growth 0.00099031 0.0015025 0.01052987 -0.0238923 0.019417 
L.renew 0.00198707 -0.0034796 0.00627198 -0.0035301 0.0334494 







Figure A1: Empirical Distribution of Y02 patent counts, Negative Binomial Distribution, and Poisson 
Distribution 
 
Source: Own Calculation 
 
 
 
